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Abstract. A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of
the agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. We initiate a
game theoretic study of sponsored search auctions, such as those used by Google and Yahoo!, involving incentive
driven mediators. We refer to such mediators as for-profit mediators, so as to distinguish them from mediators
introduced in prior work, who have no monetary incentives, and are driven by the altruistic goal of implementing
certain desired outcomes. We show that in our model, (i) players/advertisers can improve their payoffs by choosing
to use the services of the mediator, compared to directly participating in the auction; (ii) the mediator can obtain
monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its group of advertisers; and (iii) the payoffs of the mediator
and the advertisers it plays for are compatible with the incentive constraints from the advertisers who do dot use
its services. A simple intuition behind the above result comes from the observation that the mediator has more
information about and more control over the bid profile than any individual advertiser, allowing her to reduce the
payments made to the auctioneer, while still maintaining incentive constraints. Further, our results indicate that
there are significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue to
develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents to coexist.
1 Introduction
With the growing popularity of the Web for obtaining information via search, sponsored search advertising, where
advertisers pay to appear alongside the algorithmic results, has become a significant business model and is responsible
for the success of internet giants such as Google and Yahoo! The statistics show that the growth of the overall online
advertising market has been around 30% every year, as compared to the 1-2% of the traditional media. The first
quarter of 2007 also saw a tremendous increase in revenue from online advertising that is 26% over that in 2006.
Search remains the largest revenue format, accounting for more than 40% of the 2006 full year revenues of around
$17 billion.
In a search-based advertising format, the Search Engine allocates the available advertising space using an auction,
where individual advertisers bid upon specific keywords. When a user queries for a keyword, the search engine (the
auctioneer) allocates the advertisement space to the bidding merchants based on their bid values and their estimated
fitness values. Usually, the ads appear in a separate section of the page designated as “sponsored search results,” which
is located above or to the right of the organic/algorithmic results. Each position in such a list of sponsored links is
called a slot. Generally, users are more likely to notice and click on a higher ranked slot, leading to more traffic for
the corresponding advertisers. Therefore, advertisers prefer to be in higher ranked slots and compete for them. In a
popular scheme, known as the Cost-Per-Click (CPC) or the Pay-Per-Click (PPC) model, whenever a user clicks on an
ad, the corresponding advertiser pays an amount specified by the auctioneer.
From the above description, we can note that after merchants have bid for a specific keyword, when that keyword
is queried, auctioneer follows two steps. First, she allocates the slots to the advertisers. Normally, this allocation is
done using some ranking function. Secondly, she decides, through some pricing scheme, how much a merchant should
be charged if the user clicks on her ad and in general this depends on which slot she was assigned, on her bid and
that of others. In the auction formats for sponsored search, there are two ranking functions, namely rank by bid (RBB)
and rank by revenue(RBR) and there are two pricing schemes, namely generalized first pricing(GFP) and generalized
second pricing(GSP) which have been used widely. In RBB, bidders are ranked solely according to their bid values.
The advertiser with the highest bid gets first slot, that with the second highest bid gets the second slot and so on. In
RBR, the bidders are ranked according to the product of their bid value and quality score. The quality score represents
the merchant’s relevance to the specific keyword, which can basically be interpreted as the possibility that her ad will
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be viewed if given a slot irrespective of what slot position she is given. In GFP, the bidders are essentially charged
the amount they bid and in GSP they are charged an amount which is enough to ensure their current slot position. For
example, under RBB allocation, GSP charges a bidder an amount equal to the bid value of the bidder just below her.
Formal analysis of such sponsored search advertising models has been done extensively in recent years, from
algorithmic as well as from game theoretic perspectives[3, 7, 4, 1, 9, 5, 6]. For example, the existence of different types
of incentive-driven Nash equilibria has been established. Further, the notion of a mediator in such position auctions
has also been discussed[2]. A mediator is a reliable entity, which can play on the behalf of agents in a given game,
however it can not enforce the use of its services, and each agent is free to participate in the game directly. In the paper
by Ashlagi et al.[2] and the references therein, the motivation for the use of mediator comes from the search of means
to implement particular outcomes, such as VCG, in a given mechanism such as RBR with GSP. However, the mediators
considered so far are altruistic in nature and have no incentives, and in particular, their only goal is to implement certain
outcomes despite the financial cost incurred. As we know, the marketplace is mostly about incentives- a game between
selfish agents- and it would be interesting to study mediators which are not altruistic.
In our present work, we initiate a study of mediators in sponsored search auctions, which may not be altruistic in
nature. We call such mediators as for-profit mediators and show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using
the services of the mediator compared to directly participating in the auction and mediator can also obtain monetary
benefit by managing the advertising burden of its advertisers and in fact at the same time being compatible with
incentive constraints from the advertisers who do dot use its service. The simple intuition behind the above result
comes from the observation that since the mediator has more information about and more control over the bid profile
than any individual advertiser, she could possibly modify their bids, before reporting to the auctioneer (search engine),
in a manner to improve their payoff and could retain a fraction of the improved payoff. Thus, our results show that
mediators can play a significant role in sponsored search auctions, and can potentially impact the revenues earned by
the auctioneer.
2 Definitions and Model Setup
In a formal setup, there are K slots to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders. A bidder i has a true valuation ti
(known only to the bidder i) for the specific keyword and she bids vi. The expected click through rate (CTR) of
an ad put by bidder i when allocated slot j has the form γjei i.e. separable in to a position effect and an advertiser
effect. γj’s can be interpreted as the probability that an ad will be noticed when put in slot j and it is assumed that
γ1 > γ2 > · · · > γK > 0. ei can be interpreted as the probability that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked on if
noticed and is refered as the relevance of bidder i. This is the quality score used in the RBR allocation rule mentioned
earlier. The payoff/utility of bidder i when given slot j at a price of p is given by eiγj(ti − p) and they are assumed
to be rational agents trying to maximize their payoffs. As of now, Google as well as Yahoo! uses schemes closely
modeled as RBR with GSP. The bidders are ranked according to eivi and the slots are allocated as per this ranks. For
simplicity of notation, assume that the ith bidder is the one allocated slot i according to this ranking rule, then i is
charged an amount equal to ei+1vi+1
ei
.
Let the bid profile without any mediation be (under RBB) v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vL > vL+1 > vL+2 > · · · >
vK > vK+1. Now suppose that the bidders 1, 2, . . . , L manage their bidding process through a same third party i.e.
the mediator. Since the mediator has much more information about and more control over the bid profile than the
individual advertisers it is likely that she could modify the associated bids in a manner to increase her payoff and
that of the associated advertisers. For example, the mediator can simply bid v′1 = v1, v
′
2 = v
′
3 = · · · = v
′
L = vL
and she pays (under GSP) an amount (L − 1)vL + vL+1 which is much smaller than
∑L
j=1 vj+1 without mediation.
Mediator can distribute a part of this profit to the associated advertisers and therefore those advertisers along with the
mediator profit at the expense of revenue loss by the auctioneer. This is the basic intuition behind why advertising via
mediation can be good to the advertisers and the advertisers can stick to their traditional media companies even for
advertising in sponsored search and other such auctions. However, the above intuition is ofcourse not a formal game-
theoretic argument why the collusion via mediation will work as we do also need to argue that the other advertisers
(the advertisers who do not advertise via the mediator) still do not have incentives to change their slot positions. In
the following we present a game theoretic analysis for the position auctions via mediation and show that the intuition
given above is indeed true.
We consider the case where there is only one mediator and the analysis in the other cases essentially remains
similar. The advertisers who bid via the mediator will be called M -bidders and all other advertisers will be called
I-bidders. The essential features of the position auctions via mediation is:
– M -bidders report their bids to the mediator.
– M -bidders do not want to change the positions they get via directly reporting to the auctioneer3 however they give
mediator the right to change their bids before reporting to the auctioneer for a potential increase in their payoffs.
– Mediator chooses a suitable set of bids for the associated advertisers and report accordingly to the auctioneer on
behalf of them.
– I-bidders report their bids to the auctioneer directly.
3 Designing for-profit mediators
Let us first consider the RBR (rank by revenue) scheme with GSP(generalized second price) currently being used
by Google and Yahoo!. The advertisers are ranked according to ri = eivi where ei is the relevance (quality score).
Let us name the advertisers by this ranking i.e. r1 > r2 > · · · > rL > rL+1 > · · · > rK > rK > · · · > rN ,
therefore the ith bidders pays ei+1vi+1
ei
= ri+1
ei
under GSP. Let us first analyze the incentive and revenue properties
for the case where the top L advertisers are the M -bidders. We will be interested in a Walrasian type of equilibria of
the associated game, which is called symmetric Nash equilibria(SNE) as proposed by Varian[9] and Edelman et al[3].
However, similar analysis can be done for non-symmetric Nash equilibria and as we will note later, the mediator and
the advertisers might be even more better off in the case of non-symmetric Nash equlibria. Under SNE, the bidders
have no incentive to change to another positions even at the current price paid by the bidders currently at that position.
Note that this is a stronger condition than usual Nash equilibrium condition which for the case of moving to higher
position requires the defecting bidder to pay the bid of the advertiser holding the position currently, which is more than
the price paid by her under GSP. The bids v1, v2, . . . , vL, vL+1, . . . vK . . . are at the SNE of the auction without any
mediation, therefore in the original game the bidders have no incentives to defect from their current positions4. Now
the problem is to how should the mediator modify the bids of M -bidders so as to maintain the same incentives for the
I-bidders and to improve her and M-bidders’ payoffs. Here, mediator’s payoff is defined to be a fixed fraction of the
total improvement in payoffs from the M-bidders over what they could have obtained without using her service, up to
an additive constant.
Let the mediator modify the bids as r′i = r for i = 1, 2, . . . , l and r
′
i = ri for i = l + 1, . . . , L, then what r and
l should she choose5. The auctioneer sees the bid profile r ≥ r ≥ · · · ≥ r > rl+1 > · · · > rL > rL+1 > · · · >
rK > . . . . Since the original bid profile was at SNE, no j ≥ L + 1 would like to deviate to any other position s for
l ≤ s ≤ K + 1. Now, only position a j ≥ L + 1 can deviate to is the position 1 (she can not do better than this by
moving to 2, . . . , l− 1 for she will be paying same price to get less clicks).
The condition that the I-bidders do not want to move to position 1 is
γjej(tj −
rj+1
ej
) ≥ γ1ej(tj −
r
ej
) ∀j ≥ L+ 1
γj(ejtj − rj+1) ≥ γ1(ejtj − r) ∀j ≥ L+ 1
∴ r ≥ (1−
γj
γ1
)ejtj +
γj
γ1
rj+1 ∀j ≥ L+ 1
Let
r∗ = max
j≥L+1
{(1−
γj
γ1
)ejtj +
γj
γ1
rj+1}
then any selection of r such that r ≥ r∗ and r > rl+1 is fine at SNE and the mediator chooses r = r∗ and an l such
that rl ≥ r > rl+1. Note that such an l ≥ 2 always exists as r ≤ r2 (for the I-bidders did not want to move to position
1 in the original game at SNE)6,7.
3 Relaxing this condition gives more freedom to the mediator and she could possibly do even better by changing their positions as
illustrated later in the paper, however advertisers might not like to go down in slot position due to decrease in traffic as well as
branding impression value.
4 It is reasonable to assume this as the auction process has been going for a while now. Further, this requirement can be relaxed-
the mediator first bids on the behalf of the M-bidders to figure out and evolve to an equilibrium before implementing her strategy
to modify their bids.
5 The bids will actually be modified so that r
′
i = r + (L − i)ǫ for an infinitesimally small ǫ > 0. In practice, this ǫ can not be
less than $0.01, however for the purpose of analysis, as in earlier works, we assume that it is a continuous parameter that can be
made infinitesimally small.
6 Of course, the mediator will not be able to choose such a r and l all at once and will rather evolve to it by trying suitable rl’s.
7 Sometimes for example when l = 2 in the above, the mediator could possibly do even better by modifying bids as r1 > r2 >
r ≥ r ≥ · · · ≥ r > rl+1 > · · · > rL > rL+1 > · · · > rK > . . . and so on.
The mediator now pays (
∑l−1
j=1 γj)r+
∑L
j=l γjrj+1 on behalf of the M -bidders and the net total gain for mediator
is
l−1∑
j=1
(rj+1 − r)γj
and the mediator can distribute a fraction of this to the associated advertisers. It is clear that this is at the expense of
the loss in the revenue of the auctioneer. Note that in the case when there are only M -bidders and no I-bidders, the
auctioneer gets the minimum price set for all the slots. Now let us illustrate the above analysis by an example listed in
Table 1 wherein the bid profile {ri} is first verified to be at symmetric Nash equlibrium in Table 2 by recalling that to
verify this we need only check the equilibrium condition for one slot up and one slot down positions (locally envy free
property) and finally a suitable r is chosen in Table 3.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
γi 1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.15 0.10 0
eiti 26 22 20 18 17 15 12 12 9
ri = eivi 25 20 16 15 14 13 11 10 9
eiPPCi 20 16 15 14 13 11 10 9 0
r
′
i = eiv
′
i 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14
reduced eiPPCi 14.2 14.2 14.2 14 13
Table 1. Position based CTRs, true valuations, bid profile, and modified bid profile when {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} are the M -bidders (PPCi
denotes payment per click by the bidder i).
position j payoff: payoff by defecting to j − 1: payoff by defecting to j + 1: SNE condition satisfied
uj = γj(ejtj − rj+1) u
j−1
j = γj−1(ejtj − rj) u
j+1
j = γj+1(ejtj − rj+2) (YES/NO)
1 1 (26 -20)= 0.6 (26-16) =
6 6 YES
2 0.6 (22 -16)= 1(22-20)= 0.5 (22-15) =
3.6 2 3.5 YES
3 0.5 (20 -15)= 0.6 (20-16)= 0.4 (20-14) =
2.5 2.4 2.4 YES
4 0.4 (18 -14)= 0.5 (18 -15)= 0.3 (18-13)=
1.6 1.5 1.5 YES
5 0.3 (17-13)= 0.4 (17-14) = 0.2(17-11)=
1.2 1.2 1.2 YES
6 0.2 (15-11)= 0.3 (15-13)= 0.15(15-10)=
0.8 0.6 0.75 YES
7 0.15 (12-10)= 0.2 (12-11)= 0.10 (12-9)=
0.3 0.2 0.3 YES
8 0.10 (12-9)= 0.15 (12-10)= 0 (12-0) =
0.3 0.3 0 YES
9 0 0.10 (9-9)= 0 0 YES
Table 2. Verifying the SNE conditions
j sj r
∗ r l improved payoff:
= ejtj − uj
Pl−1
j=1
(rj+1 − r)γj
6 15-0.8 =
14.2
7 12-0.3= 14.2 14.2 4 7.28
11.7
8 12-0.3 =
11.7
9 9-0 =
9
Table 3. Computing r and l: sj := (1− γjγ1 )ejtj +
γj
γ1
rj+1 = ejtj − γj(ejtj − rj+1) = ejtj − uj (as γ1 = 1)
If the bid profile is at non-symmetric Nash equilibrium then the mediator might do better as she can modify the
bids as r′i = r for i = 2, . . . , l and r
′
i = ri for i = 1, l+ 1, . . . , L and the condition on r now is
r ≥ max
j≥L+1
{(1−
γj
γ2
)ejtj +
γj
γ2
rj+1}.
Now let us consider the case when the M -bidders are not necessarily the top ones but l + 1, l + 2, . . . , l + L. The
mediator modifies the bids as r′j = r for j = l+2, . . . , l+ s− 1 for some s ≤ L and r
′
j = rj otherwise, therefore the
auctioneer sees the bid profile r1 > r2 > · · · > rl > rl+1 > r ≥ r · · · ≥ r > rl+s > · · · > rl+L > rl+L+1 > . . . .
As in the earlier analysis, at SNE, the only condition that need to be checked is that no j ≤ l or j ≥ l + L + 1
would want to deviate to the (l + 1)th position. Therefore, we must have for j ≤ l and j ≥ l + L+ 1 ,
γjej(tj −
rj+1
ej
) ≥ γl+1ej(tj −
r
ej
)
γj(ejtj − rj+1) ≥ γl+1(ejtj − r)
∴ r ≥ (1−
γj
γl+1
)ejtj +
γj
γl+1
rj+1.
Let
r∗ = max
{j≤l}∪{j≥l+L+1}
{(1−
γj
γl+1
)ejtj +
γj
γl+1
rj+1}
then clearly r∗ ≤ rl+2 and choosing any r ≥ r∗ and an s such that rl+s−1 ≥ r > rl+s is fine at SNE. However, in
this case or in the case when M -bidders are the top ones, such a r to improve their payoffs might not always exist as
can been seen by considering the example mentioned above when M -bidders are {2, 3, 4, 5}. However, mediator could
possibly improve even in these cases, if the M -bidders do not mind moving up in positions, as she does not neccesarily
have to satisfy the incentive constraints from higher position I-bidders to not change their current positions.
Similar analysis holds when there are different groups of M -bidders such that all advertisers in a group bid via the
same mediator whereas different groups may have different mediators associated with them. In fact, in this case the
maximization will be over smaller sets and the mediators could possibly do even better.
A possibility not analyzed above is that whether the mediator can do better by moving the positions of the adver-
tisers either individually or sliding them all together. Consider the example given earlier and let mediator slide every
M -bidder one slot down by modifying the bid profile so that r′i = 12 for all M-bidders as shown in the Table 4. It can
be verified as before that it is still at SNE and in fact in this case mediator’s payment on behalf of M-bidders is much
lesser compared to the earlier case. This suggests that indeed the mediator could do better by moving slot positions.
However, advertisers might not like to change positions, at least not to the lower slots due to associated branding
impression values coming from higher slots and even though their payoff might increase by allowing so, they might
not like to lose in terms of traffic which decreases by going down.
For-profit mediators for other mechanisms can also be designed. In particular, we discuss for-profit mediators for
truthful mechanisms in the following. Truthful mechanisms are considered to be very desirable from the advertisers’
perspective since truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every one and the advertises do not need to be sophisticated to
play the auction game. However, as we argue below it is more vulnerable to for-profit mediation and even the mediators
position j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bidder i assinged to j 6 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
eiti 15 26 22 20 18 17 12 12 9
ri = eivi 13 25 20 16 15 14 11 10 9
eiPPCi 11 20 16 15 14 13 10 9 0
r
′
i = eiv
′
i 12 12 12 12 12
reduced eiPPCi 12 12 12 12 11
improved payoff: 22.8
Table 4. Sliding positions could improve M -bidders’ and mediator’s payoffs
need not be sophisticated in this case, unlike the ones discussed earlier in this paper. In regard to position auctions,
Aggarwal et al.[1] presented a truthful mechanism called laddered auction, which is compatible with a given weighted
ranking function such as RBR, and is the unique truthful auction given this ranking function. Now, if the mediator
modifies the bids of the M -bidders in a manner so that their slot positions (i.e. ranks) do not change, the I-bidders still
report truthfully as its a dominant strategy. The mediator could choose such a minimum possible bid profile to get the
best improvement in payoffs and in particular modifying every M -bidder’s bid to a value only infinitesimally more
than just enough to retain the position of the least ranked M -bidder suffices.
4 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
Sponsored search advertising is a significant growth market and is witnessing rapid growth and evolution. The analysis
of the underlying models has so far primarily focused on the scenario, where advertisers/bidders interact directly with
the auctioneers, i.e., the Search Engines and publishers. However, the market is already witnessing the spontaneous
emergence of several categories of companies who are trying to mediate or facilitate the auction process. For example,
a number of different AdNetworks have started proliferating, and so have companies who specialize in reselling ad
inventories. Hence, there is a need for analyzing the impact of such incentive driven and for-profit agents, especially
as they become more sophisticated in playing the game.
Our results show that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the market and the emergence of
incentive-driven equilibria. Thus, we should expect the adword auction market to continue to develop richer structure,
with room for different types of agents to coexist. Another implication of our results applies to the traditional media.
Publishers of traditional media, such as newspapers and network TV and radio, have seen significant declines in their
audience market shares, as more people have shifted to the Web as the source for information and entertainment.
Their advertising revenues have decreased significantly as well. Our results show that one way these traditional media
players can retain the loyalty of their advertisers is to manage their online auctions! By mediating their auctions, they
can provide better payoffs to their clients, and thus prevent them from switching allegiance to the online giants, such
as Google and Yahoo! Other than creating a new revenue source for the traditional media businesses, it would allow
them to retain their own networks and give them precious time to reposition themselves and figure out the best possible
ways to take their content online, and compete effectively in a new market space.
Our present work on the diversification in the internet economy is only the tip of the iceberg. Further investigation
is likely to give better insights. For example, one natural constraint on the sponsored search auction comes from the
fact that there is a limit on the number of slots, in particular for the popular keywords, which limits the number of
advertisers that can be accommodated and it is likely that new market mechanisms as well as new for-profit agents
will emerge to combat or to make profit from the opportunities created by this capacity constraint, leading to a diver-
sification in the market. We are investigating this direction in a related work[8]. Further, even in the case of for-profit
mediators studied in the present work, several directions are left to explore. For example, do there exist mechanisms
which are impervious to collusion via for-profit mediation and if they do how do they effect the revenue of the auc-
tioneer? Furthermore, more sophisticated mediators such as where M -bidders need not be concecutive should also
be investigated and in general if the mediator is sophisticated enough to exploit her best possible strategy, how does
the modified profile look at equilibrium? Furthermore, for-profit mediators for other auction formats should also be
interesting to study.
References
1. G. Aggarwal, A. Goel, R. Motwani, Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords, EC 2006.
2. I. Ashlagi, D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, Mediators in Position Auctions, EC 2007 and references therein.
3. B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of
Dollars Worth of Keywords, American Economic Review 2007.
4. S. Lahaie, An Analysis of Alternative Slot Auction Designs for Sponsored Search, EC 2006.
5. S. Lahaie, D. Pennock, Revenue Analysis of a Family of Ranking Rules for Keyword Auctions, EC 2007.
6. M. Mahdian, H. Nazerzadeh, A. Saberi, Allocating online advertisement space with unreliable estimates, EC 2007
7. A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, V. Vazirani, AdWords and generalized on-line matching, FOCS 2005.
8. S. K. Singh, V. P. Roychowdhury, H. Gunadhi and B. A. Rezaei, Capacity constraints and the inevitability of mediators in
adword auctions, In preparation.
9. H. Varian, Position Auctions, To appear in International Journal of Industrial Organization.
